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Egalitarian Allocations and the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value

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dc.contributor.author DRAGAN, Irinel
dc.date.accessioned 2020-11-04T07:32:36Z
dc.date.available 2020-11-04T07:32:36Z
dc.date.issued 2018
dc.identifier.citation DRAGAN, Irinel. Egalitarian Allocations and the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value. In: CAIM 2018: The 26th Conference on Applied and Industrial Mathematics: Book of Abstracts, Technical University of Moldova, September 20-23, 2018. Chişinău: Bons Offices, 2018, p. 73. en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://repository.utm.md/handle/5014/11086
dc.description Only Abstract en_US
dc.description.abstract In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value of a game is a set of games in which the Shapley Value is the same as the initial one. In the Inverse Set we determined a family of games for which this Shapley Value is a coalitional rational value. The Egalitarian Allocation of the game is efficient, so that in the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, the allocation is the same as the initial one, but may not be coalitional rational. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Bons Offices en_US
dc.rights Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States *
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ *
dc.subject cooperative games en_US
dc.subject egalitarian allocation en_US
dc.subject coalitional rationality en_US
dc.subject inverse problem en_US
dc.subject Shapley value en_US
dc.title Egalitarian Allocations and the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value en_US
dc.type Article en_US


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